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I. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, growing attention
to issues in the financial aid regulatory space caused governments and
interest groups to call for enhanced regulation of for-profit, public, and
private educational institutions. Three notable reports from the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) pointed to substantial worries
about the ability and willingness of providers in higher education markets
to convince students to take on substantial debt in the pursuit of degrees.1
For instance, in the case of proprietary schools, the GAO noted:
Students are required to pass a test of basic math and English skills
* Alexander M. Crenshaw Professor of Public Policy Department of Public
Administration and Policy University of Georgia, 204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602
aw@uga.edu 706-542-2898.
** Managing Partner Informative Analytics janetwhitfordggmail.com.
1. Three reports form the auditing core of the federal government's recent policy attempts
to expand regulation in this arena. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600,
PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP

ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2009) [hereinafter GAO-09600, PROPRIETARY

SCHOOLS]; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FORFRAUD AND

PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED

(2010)

[hereinafter

Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-11-10,

ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES

GAO-10-948T,
HIGHER

FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES];

EDUCATION:

U.S.

STRONGER FEDERAL

OVERSIGHT

INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO SCHOOL RECRUITERS
EDUCATION].
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(2010)

NEEDED

TO ENFORCE

[hereinafter

GAO-ll-10,
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or have a high school diploma or GED to qualify for federal
student aid. Yet, GAO and others have found violations of these
requirements. For example, when GAO analysts posing as
prospective students took the basic skills test at a local proprietary
school, the independent test administrator gave out answers to
some of the test questions. In addition, the analysts' test forms
were tampered with-their actual answers were crossed out and
changed-to ensure the individuals passed the test.2
In the case of an investigation of for-profit colleges, the GAO noted:
Undercover tests at 15 for-profit colleges found that 4 colleges
encouraged fraudulent practices and that all 15 made deceptive or
otherwise questionable statements to GAO's undercover
applicants. Four undercover applicants were encouraged by
college personnel to falsify their financial aid forms to qualify for
federal aid-for example, one admissions representative told an
applicant to fraudulently remove $250,000 in savings. Other
college representatives exaggerated undercover applicants'
potential salary after graduation and failed to provide clear
information about the college's program duration, costs, or
graduation rate despite federal regulations requiring them to do
SO. 3

More generally, following an earlier study of the proliferation of
incentive compensation for student recruiters, the GAO pointed its finger
squarely at the U.S. Department of Education (ED) for failures in its
oversight of such programs across a wide array of higher education
organizations.4 The GAO explained that while "[e]ducation has processes
to monitor schools for potential violations, [] its methods to detect
violations and track monitoring activities are limited," and that
substantial changes were needed "to strengthen Education's monitoring
and enforcement of the incentive compensation ban and to help protect

2. GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS, supra note 1. More developed discussion of this
point follows in the report. Id. at 22-25.
3. GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES, supra note 1. Deeper discussion of this

general issue follows in the report. Id. at 4. Note that GAO inquired about one degree program at
each college. Id. at 2. Each college was given a fictitious student with the characteristics of "low
income/assets;" this student would qualify for federal loans and/or grants. Id. at 2-3. The college

was also given a fictitious student with the characteristics of "high income/assets;" this student
would only qualify for unsubsidized loans. Id. Majors included in such "experiments" included
cosmetology, construction management, and elementary education. Id. at 2. Those engaging in

deceptive practices were referred to regulatory authorities. Id. at 4.
4.

GAO-11-10, Higher Education, supra note 1, at 2,4.
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students and the federal investment in their education."
The problems of higher education and financial aid are widely
discussed in the popular press, and for good reason: the U.S. federal
government holds a roughly $1.4 trillion student-loan debt portfolio, 6 and
while some movement has occurred with regard to debt forgiveness and
loosening the rules about debt discharge through bankruptcy,' the federal
government has substantial issues in simply estimating the size of that
portfolio and the potential impact of proposed forgiveness programs.8
The purpose of this Essay is to consider the general problem of the
regulation of student financial aid, and its implementation via networks
of higher education organizations in concert with public and private
lenders, from the lens of "regulatory burden." It has become fashionable
to speak of the procedures for joint implementation of this system in
terms of burden. For example, a 2013 study from the National
Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA),
entitled "Getting It Right: Analyzing the Accuracy of Federal Burden
Estimates for Title 1V Financial Aid Compliance," described the situation
as one-sided. 9 In their view:
Greater transparency from the Department of Education would
allow for a more detailed understanding of how burden estimates
are calculated. It would also form a solid basis for constructive
dialogue on how to ensure that estimates reflect, with more
representative accuracy, the effort that school financial aid offices
must undertake for the purpose of compliance.'o
The problem, of course, is that one person's "regulatory burden" is
another person's "protection against predatory market practices."
Historically, regulation has sought to balance competing goods. On one
hand, markets are powerful mechanisms for assembling and using
5.

Id.

6.

OFF. OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PORTFOLIO,

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio (providing the Federal Student
Aid Portfolio Summary of the current student-loan debt).
7. See, e.g., Josh Mitchell, White House Floats Bankruptcy Processfor Some Student
Debt, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2015,8:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-studyingnew-bankruptcy-options-for-student-loan-borrowers-1426004272.
8. See, e.g., Josh Mitchell & Andrea Fuller, US. Eyes Big Data on Student Debt, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 6:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-eyes-big-data-on-student-debt-

1426890836.
9.

NAT'L Ass'N OF STUDENT FIN. AD ADM'RS, GETTING IT RIGHT: ANALYZING THE
BURDEN ESTIMATES FOR TITLE IV FINANCIAL AID COMPLIANCE (2013)

ACCURACY OF FEDERAL

[hereinafter NASFAA].
10. Id. at 7. Of course, key considerations in such settings include decision points in
calculating burden, formulas, levels of transparency, and whether components of the burden
estimation formula are concealed. Id.
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resources to provide goods and services demanded by the public. On the
other hand, given market imperfections, citizens often demand that
governments protect people from market actors that use those
imperfections for their own benefit. In the case of student financial aid,
though, this balancing act is complicated by the unique role of the federal
government as a large provider of financial assistance to students.
Effectively, in many cases, the federal government has become almost
a monopolistic purchaser of education for students, although, in the end,
students are ultimately responsible for repaying government loans and
other debt incurred in the search for educational attainment.
We begin this Essay with a review of the development of regulatory
burden as a general problem in the relationship between states and
markets. Following that, we offer the financial aid policy space as a
special regulatory environment, and consider the general structure of that
space given the typical treatment of regulation in our understanding of
business-government relations. In that section, we review the types of
evidence that exist about the financial aid regulatory environment, and
then provide evidence on regulatory burden as a general problem in this
area. We also consider the possibility that higher education's market
segments are differentially regulated-that some segments are overregulated, and others are under-regulated. Finally, in the last section, we
reflect on the problem of interpreting and managing regulatory burden in
higher education markets, with special attention to the question of
whether differential regulation changes the incentives of different market
actors.
II. THE CURIOUS CONCEPT OF REGULATORY BURDEN

In this Part, we briefly review the theory of regulation to introduce
regulatory burden as a core concept in assessing the evidence about the
student financial aid regulatory environment in the United States.
Our starting point is the claim that the higher education system is a
compilation of markets of varying shapes, sizes, and constructions. This
claim is not immune to critique, for many have argued that this
evolution-this "restructuring [of] higher education as a market rather
than a regulated public sector""-is a new competitive environment. Yet
in important ways, those who have focused on this institutional change in
our organizational arrangements for providing higher education have
missed the point of these changes. One way this change has been
characterized is that "[t]he result is an evolution of the higher education
11. FRANK NEWMAN ET AL., THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: RHETORIC, REALITY,
AND THE RISKS OF THE MARKET, at xi (2004). While such restructuring has occurred over long
periods of time, this report gives special attention to more recent structural changes.
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sector toward operating far more as a market, with universities and
colleges competing to supply the service of education, as opposed to the
concept of higher education as a public sector structured principally by
government regulation."' 2 The upshot of this view is that while "in the
old world, government would tend to depend on regulations to control
costs," now government relies on competition.13
In important ways, this view is naYve about the role of regulation in
sustaining markets. A more nuanced view is that regulation is
fundamental to the functioning of all markets, that forces outside market
actors to shape competition both in the short- and long-term, and that all
market actors have incentives to shape that competitive environment to
benefit their own competitive positions. This view is well-described by
David Baron in his book Business andIts Environment.14
Baron summarizes it in this way:
The causes of these problems are frequently found not in a
company's market environment but instead in forces outside its
markets. Indeed, for many companies, market success depends notjust on their products and services, the efficiency of their
operations, their internal organization, and the organization of their
supply chains, distribution channels, and alliance networks.
Success also depends on how effectively they deal withgovernments, interest groups, activists, and the public. The forces
these parties generate can foreclose entry into new markets, limit
price increases, and raise the costs of competing. They can also
unlock markets, reduce regulation, handicap rivals, and generate
competitive advantage.15
The focus for all managers of organizations in this space, then, is to
integrate the organization's "non-market strategy" with its market
strategies. In Baron's view, though, managers historically have ignored
the former and mostly focused on the latter.16
Inevitably this focus leads to a consideration of how market actors
seek to "write the rules of the game" to benefit their organization in these
markets-even to the point in many cases of shaping the creation of new
markets. This view fits with perspectives on regulation that developed
over the latter half of the twentieth century.
Helm offers a useful (though simplified) discussion of a broad swath
12.
13.

Id. at 2.
Id.

14.
15.

DAVID P. BARON, BusINEss AND ITS ENVIRONMENT (7th ed. 2012).
David P. Baron, The Nonmarket Strategy System, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 73, 73 (Fall

1995).
16.

See generally id.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA W & PUBLIC POLICY

506

[Vol- 28

of findings about regulation in a political economy-one that centers on
regulatory burden as a core measuring stick for the quality of regulation.17
In his view, the first question is whether a broad theoretical case can be
made that existing regulations are excessive; the second is whether
empirical evidence exists that the level of regulation lowers economic
performance.' 8 Once those questions have been answered, designers
should address when there should be regulation (the "optimal" level) and
then, based on that level, the form it should take.19
Once regulation has been decided, the attention shifts to addressing
the different costs of regulation. Because there are different kinds of
regulation, and because regulation is heterogeneous in its effects on
different market actors, economists want to measure regulation's
allocative effects (such as how it shapes decisions to allocate resources
or invest in new markets) and its administrative burden. 2 0 For Helm,
"[w]hile the policy debate tends to focus on the administrative burden, it
is the allocative effects that are likely to be the most important for
economic performance." 2 1
Allocative effects are fundamental because they are shaped by the
strategies of market actors. Consider an actor that will benefit from
enhanced regulation. How might that occur? Just as consumers can
demand regulation, so can producers. Helm elaborates on three ways
producers might benefit from regulation that are particularly important in
higher education markets: "to protect sunk costs in natural monopoly; to
promote R&D and innovation; and to enhance (or limit) competition."22
Once firms seek regulation for protection's sake, the polity is required to
regulate that concentrated market with regard to competition, monopoly,
and other antitrust considerations.
The problem for economists is how the supply of regulation responds
to such demand. Polities produce regulation in response, and the
argument is often made that such regulation is over-supplied relative to
the optimal level for competitive markets. Responsive politicians may
become "captured" by regulated entities, so institutional designers shift
to the mechanisms that supply regulation to create better incentives for
that supply. Such solutions center on delegation of the regulatory function
to independent agencies that rely on professionalized expertise to decide

17. See, e.g., Dieter Helm, Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden, 22
OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y. 169 (2006).

18.
19.
20.

Id. at 170.
Id.
Id. at 172.

21. Id. (explaining that allocative effects are ways of considering the impact of economic
changes on both the structure of markets but also their heterogeneous effects on the decisions of

consumers and producers).
22. Id. at 173.
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the right supply and its administration.2 3 Even though most arrangements
are "second-best" (at best), there are worse institutional arrangements for
designing the regulatory environment-most often, by politicians with
short-term incentives to over- or under-regulate.
The problem with assessing regulatory burden in such systems is that
it depends on so many factors. A simple distinction is: "burden for
whom." Does the regulator or the regulated entity carry (on average) the
greater burden of regulation? Another distinction is whether the burden
is "justifiable"-that is, given the purposes of regulation, is the average
burden too high to justify seeking those benefits? Put another way, do the
costs of regulation outweigh the expected benefits? Or alternatively, is
the burden high for some market entities and not for others-and is that
differential burden justifiable given the purposes of regulation?
One clearly sees the positive and normative implications of these
theoretical claims. On one hand, these positive claims about regulation
suggest that not all regulation is created for the purpose of benefiting
society as a whole, and that regulated entities see benefits from being
involved in shaping, and indeed in pursuing, regulation. At the same time,
as Baron notes above, these views have normative implications: that
regulated entities should become involved in regulation and that some
entities should seek (for their own benefit) increased regulation as a way
of constructing market barriers to entry (or at least in increasing the costs
of doing business and shifting the marginal cost curve for other, less
competitive organizations).24
Indeed, at a minimum, consumers should use regulation to shape the
costs of production and thus change market prices, although whether they
should pursue increases or decreases in regulation is itself an empirical
question (depending on the relative thickness of supply in markets,
whether they individually benefit from reduced access to education by
their own competitors in the labor market, etc.).
The upshot of this discussion is that regulatory burden is a loaded
term. We can speak of regulation's benefits, though we want to be exact
about who receives those benefits since it might include both consumers
and producers. We can speak of regulation's costs (though, again,
exactness is important because both producers and consumers-in
addition to regulators-pay the costs of regulation). In contrast to more
neutral terms like benefit and cost, burden has a valence. Burden has an
intrinsic aversiveness-a negative valence-because it neglects the
benefits side of the equation entirely.
One main claim in this paper is that discussions about the regulatory

23.

See GARY J. MILLER & ANDREw B. WHITFORD, ABOVE POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC

DISCRETION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT, 141-67 (2016).
24. See generally Baron, supra note 15.
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environment for student financial aid have been cast (unfortunately) in
terms of the regulatory burden of the suppliers of education. There has
been little systematic discussion of the various benefits that are
distributed to various groups by the institutional design of that regulatory
environment. The emphasis has focused largely on the costs (both
compliance costs and obligations due to perceived "red tape" 25 ) carried
by schools that mediate the relationship between the student requesting
financial aid to pay for college, and the lender (mostly backstopped by
the federal government) who supplies that financing.
Red tape is now an elemental concept in our conversations about the
rule-bound nature of policymaking and the administration of programs in
large, complex bureaus. 26 Likewise, studies of regulation have focused
on compliance costs-located outside the regulator, and borne largely by
regulated entities-as an elemental concern in the role of governments in
shaping the incentives of firms. 27 The devil is in the details for both
concepts though: what is the best measure of "red tape" or "compliance
costs" that is reliable and divorced from the interests of the regulated
entity?
In the next Part, we move this conversation forward by considering
the evolution of this discussion to center on the regulatory burden
perceived by providers of education and training.
HI. TYPES OF EVIDENCE ABOUT FINANCIAL AID REGULATION

Surprisingly little research attention has been devoted to the
regulatory environment of student financial aid. For instance, Cheit noted
in 1977 that federal regulatory oversight was increasing and that
educational institutions perceived increases in the burden of regulation. 2 8
By the 1990s, researchers focused largely on the continuing lack of clarity
for determining aid eligibility, 29 and appreciation of the growing need for
regulation, but also wariness about the correct form. 30 There was also a

&

25. E.g., Barry Bozeman, A Theory of Government "Red Tape," 3 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
THEORY 273, 274 (1993).

26.

E.g., id. at 278-79.

27. See, e.g., Dorothy M. Daley et al., Checks, Balances, and the Cost of Regulation:
Evidencefrom the American States, 60 POL. REs. Q. 696, 696 (2007); Julian R. Franks et al., The
Directand Compliance Costs ofFinancialRegulation, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1547, 1547 (1997).
28. Earl F. Cheit, The Benefits and Burdens of Federal FinancingAssistance to Higher

Education, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 90, 90-91 (1977). We could debate about whether regulation was
"creeping" or in response to a particular event, but the main point remains that 1977 was a key
point of departure for higher education markets. See id.
29. E.g., Thomas Flint, HistoricalNotes on Regulation in the FederalStudent Assistance
Programs, 21 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 33, 37 (1991).
30. E.g., Robert Pernell Huff, An Analysis of the Regulation ofFederal Student Financial
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growing sense of the political fragmentation of post-secondary education
(especially with regard to the passage of the Higher Education Act (HEA)
of 1992).31 After 2000, researchers and commentators focused directly on
the role of the HEA and its reauthorization as shaping the balance
between the benefits and costs of regulation. 3 2 Notably, in a working
paper, Cellini and Goldin provide evidence that institutional designs
allowed access to Title IV funding influenced prices-for-profit schools
with access to such funding charge tuition prices that are substantially
higher than those without access.
In contrast, there has been substantial discussion of the consequences
of that environment for borrowers, with much of that attention being
placed on the role of for-profit institutions. 3 4 Indeed, the data in Figure 1
show the count of investigative reports, reported by the ED Office of
Inspector General (OIG), which we consider related to the regulation of
access to financial aid. We recognize some uncertainty in coding such
events (with regard to the contribution of financial aid to the case,
compared to other considerations and sources of fault, or with regard to
the type of organization involved), but the trend in OIG attention to
financial aid is fairly clear. From 1999 to 2014, the number of events has
grown almost every year. Even if we account for volatility in the time
Aid, 25 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 5, 11-13 (1995).
31. See Susan B. Hannah, The Higher EducationAct of 1992: Skills, Constraints, and the
PoliticsoffHigher Education, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 498, 498 (1996).
32. E.g., REBECCA R. SKINNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33909, INSTITUTIONAL
ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN TITLE IV STUDENT AID PROGRAMS UNDER THE HIGHER
EDUCATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES (2007); LINDSEY BURKE, THE
HERITAGE FOUND., REAUTHORIZNG THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT-TOWARD POLICIES THAT

INCREASE ACCESS AND LOWER COSTS (2014), http://www.heritage.org/education/report/
Robin L.
reauthorizing-the-higher-education-act-toward-policies-increase-access-and-lower;
Capt, Analysis ofthe Higher Education Act Reauthorizations:FinancialAid Policy Influencing
College Access and Choice, 3 ADMIN. ISSUES J. 1, 16 (Oct. 2013).
33. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Claudia Goldin, Does FederalStudent Aid Raise Tuition?
New Evidence on For-ProfitColleges, 6 AM. EcoN. J.: EcoN. POL'Y 174, 201 (2014) (providing a
substantial example of the use of new statistical methods for the assessment of these questions
about higher education markets). See Eduardo Porter, The Bane and the Boon of For-Profit
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/business/economy/

the-bane-and-the-boon-of-for-profit-colleges.html.
34. E.g., Katherine Mangan, Enrollments Slipped This Fall, With For-ProfitSector Hit
Hardest, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/
Enrollments-Slipped-This-FallI143573/; Eduardo Porter, The Bane and the Boon ofFor-Profit
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/business/economy/
the-bane-and-the-boon-of-for-profit-colleges.htmi; Monsters in the Making?, ECONOMIST (July
22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16643333; Schools of Hard Knocks, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16990955.
35. For underlying data see ED OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (last
updated Sept. 15, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/ireports.html. The data was
gathered and coded in February 2015.
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series, there is a substantial structural break in the data around 2010, with
greater numbers of events after that year. Unfortunately, the nature of the
reports makes it impossible to draw any conclusions about the relative
incidence of such enforcement actions across institutional types such as
public, private, and for-profit colleges.
Figure 1 - Event Count per Year

91

U,'I-

W0-

2000

2005

2010

2015

Year
Our position in this Essay is that the enforcement of regulatory
violations in the student financial aid space is perhaps less important than
the hidden actions taken by educational institutions that are charged with
administering the system. Regulation is a process of co-production.
Traditionally, agencies would decide the "rules of the game," but the
rules are made real when regulated entities comply with them. If we
account for Baron's views on regulation as a system, regulated entities
also have good reason to help shape the rules of the game. 3 6 In this view,
formal enforcement is just the "tip of the iceberg"-most of the
36.

See, e.g., Baron, supranote 15.
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interesting actions occur in making the rules and then in the myriad
decisions in the compliance process.
It is the compliance process that provides opportunities for regulated
entities to complain about "regulatory burden." Consider the results from
the Higher Education Regulations Study, carried out by the U.S.
Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance in 2010 and
201 1.37 As noted in the media, the results were headline-inducing:
"[e]ighty-six percent of officials found regulations under the Higher
Education Act burdensome or overly burdensome. Of the 15 regulations
the panel asked about, a majority of respondents said 14 were
'burdensome' or 'very burdensome,' and cited 13 whose elimination
would yield significant savings for colleges." 38 As part of the 2008 HEA
reauthorization, the Committee completed a review of regulations to
search for rules that were "duplicative, no longer necessary, inconsistent
with other federal regulations, or overly burdensome." 39 Perhaps the
strongest statement made about the results was that:
Respondents also criticized the "one size fits all" approach to
regulation: 83 percent of executives and 73 percent of office
administrators said they supported sector-specific regulations, and
37.

U.S.

ADVISORY

COMM. ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE,

HIGHER EDUCATION

REGULATIONS STUDY FINAL REPORT (2011), http://www.chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/HERS
%20Final%2OReport.pdf [hereinafter U.S. ACSFA REPORT]. In full disclosure, one co-author
served as a design consultant on the survey that formed the basis for most of the findings reported
in the 2011 Higher Education Regulations Study of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Student
Financial Assistance.
38. Libby A. Nelson, Too Many Rules, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 29, 2011),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/09/29/report examines regulatory burden oncoll
eges _for financial-aid. Of course, there are situations that administrators are not likely to identify
as particularly burdensome that those outside the market-or even consumers inside the marketmay see as burdensome, but the overall point of such analyses is that they are almost uniformly
assessed from the perspective of those responsible for compliance on the part of universities and
schools. See U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at 5-6. The specific regulations for which
feedback was requested included: "Conflicting Information; Entrance Counseling for Student

Loan Borrowers (Entrance Counseling); FSEOG Priority Awarding Criteria (FSEOG Priority
Awarding); Crediting Federal Student Aid to Non-Allowable Institutional Charges (NonAllowable Charges); Written Authorization to Open a Bank Account on Behalf of a Student
(Opening Bank Account); Prior Award Year Charges (Prior Year Charges); Proration of Annual
Loan Limits (Proration of Loan Limits); Overlapping and Inconsistent Timeframes for Reporting
and Consumer Disclosure Requirements (Reporting Timeframes); Volume and Scope of
Reporting and Consumer Disclosure Requirements (Reporting Volume and Scope); Return of

Title IV Funds; Return of Uncashed Credit Balance Checks (Return of Uncashed Checks); SelfCertification ofNon-Title IV Student Loans (Self-Certification); TEACH Grant Eligibility Rules
(TEACH Grant Eligibility); Overaward and Overpayment Tolerances (Tolerances); Determining
Student Eligibility for Two Federal Pell Grants in One Award Year (Two Pell Grants)" Id at 6.
For more details, see also id. app. B at 55-58.
39.

U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at 1.
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82 percent and 69 percent, respectively, said they supported
performance-based regulations. Less than 15 percent of each group
favored maintaining the current approach.4 0
Although the nature of the media's reaction to the study is indicative
of the results as represented in the report, the results were only narrowly
discussed in policy debates.
Perhaps one reason was that this study followed a series of other
reports that also conferred the widespread belief that the regulatory
environment was broken. Since 1995, there have been three major
initiatives to reduce the regulatory burden for institutions administering
student financial assistance programs. The 1995 Regulatory Reinvention
Initiative was meant to review "rules and procedures to reduce regulatory
and paperwork burden" and to change regulations that were "outdated or
otherwise in need of reform." 4 1 The 1998 HEA reauthorization required
ED to again review regulations, which became the 1999-2000 Student
Financial Assistance Regulatory Review. 42 The 2001 FED UP Initiative
again sought streamlining and simplification of regulation and the
paperwork required under the HEA.4 3
Each of these initiatives led to changes. For instance, the 1995 changes
"resulted in modifications to more than 40 sections of the Title IV
regulations," the 2000 changes also modified around 40 sections, and the
FED UP initiative led to special rulemaking sessions and additional
legislation that modified over 50 sections." Clearly, changes in
regulation occurred over time in response to such inquiries.
These three initiatives also provide a lens for observing the role of
affected interests in working to change the regulatory environment. "Each
of these prior reviews . . . progressively included more members of the
affected community through comments and negotiations." 45 The 2011
report marked a change, though, in study design in that the agency wanted
widespread participation of broad classes of institutions with regard to
perceptions of the compliance process.
Two points bear further consideration. The first is that designing such
a study requires participation when (a) entities are involved in a
compliance process (and thus perhaps in adversarial positions with regard
40. Nelson, supranote 38.
41. Student Assistance General Provisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 61796 (Dec. 1, 1995) (codified at
34 C.F.R. § 668).
42.

See U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at 1-2.

43. See, e.g., Fed Up Higher Education Technical Amendments of 2002, H.R. 4866, 107th
Cong. (2002); U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at 1-2; Memorandum from President William
J. Clinton on Reg. Reform to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Mar. 4, 1995),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP- I 995-bookl/pdfIPPP-1 995-bookl-doc-pg304.pdf
44. U.S. ACSFAREPORT, supra note 37, at 1-2.
45. Id. at 2.
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to the collection of accurate data), and (b) those same entities have
interests that vary in terms of the net benefits they receive from
compliance (e.g., in terms of reducing competition for their educational
products). A further point could be made that many of the benefits of
regulation are only reportable by two other sets of actors whose
participation was not solicited in this study-the consumers seeking
financial assistance and the government as holder of the broad loan
portfolio.
Even if we ignore those secondary interests, the problems of strategic
response bias remain. This tendency is only enhanced by the evolution of
a strong adversarial relationship between regulators and the regulated.
One way in which this played out in the context of this study was that
surveys of regulated entities work best when conducted in face-to-face
settings where the participation of knowledgable actors can be verified.
(In this study, responses were requested from both organizational leaders
and those who manage the compliance process. The first type of
respondent should have been able to speak to the overall organizational
cost of compliance, while the other could speak to the cost of individual
compliance requirements.) Response quality depends on the respondents
having direct knowledge of the compliance process.
This possibility was complicated in the case of the HERS study. In
2010, GAO responded to broad concerns about regulatory compliance
among for-T rofit organizations by deploying "mystery shoppers" to
investigate. The use of these fictional students uncovered a number of
practices that drove further concern about compliance:
At all but two of the [15] colleges visited, college employees
offered deceptive or questionable information about graduation
rates, exaggerated likely earnings, or guaranteed applicants jobs
after graduation. An employee at a small beauty college told an
applicant that barbers can earn $150,000 to $250,000 annually.
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, 90 percent of barbers
make under $43,000 a year. At a college owned by a publiclytraded company, an employee told an undercover applicant that
instead of pursuing an associate degree in criminal justice, she
should go after a medical assisting certificate with which, after
nine months of school, she would be able to earn as much as
$68,000 a year.47
The GAO findings are notable, but little recognized is how the GAO
research strategy made it difficult for others to obtain access to
46. GAO-I 0-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES, supra note 1.
47. Jennifer Epstein, Congress's 'Secret Shopper,' INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Aug. 3, 2010),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/08/03/gao.
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respondents working in compliance. It is easy to see how financial aid
officers might confuse an on-campus inquiry with a sting operation. This
issue was amplified by ED OIG's use of undercover agents in a 2007
student-aid fraud investigation, and ED's hiring in 2011 of two outside
research firms to employ mystery shoppers to identify fraud.4 8 In sum,
"[m]ystery shopping represents a new form of oversight conducted by the
Education Department, which had conducted program reviews and relied
on tips from school employees and whistleblower lawsuits to uncover
fraud." 49
The study was administered via an anonymous and confidential webbased survey instrument.5 0 Unfortunately, the goals of anonymity and
confidentiality precluded the use of a known sampling frame." One of
the direct costs of the secret shopper initiatives was the loss of ability to
make any statistical statements about the incidence of these views on
regulatory burden within the broader community of regulated entities.
This is remarkable because unlike many other social scientific
enterprises, the population of affected institutions is known ex ante; while
the responsible individuals may be unknown, their organizational
location is known with certainty. However,
numerous discussions with campus officials, association
representatives, consultants, and review panelists revealed
significant concerns in the community over the sensitive nature of
questions addressing campus-level perceptions of regulatory
burden, especially regarding processes managed by the federal
government. A substantial number of individuals refused to
participate in a survey on such topics if they or their institutions
were identifiable. 52
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that, for the 2,098 respondents (425
executives and 1,673 office administrators), primary findings such as
42% of respondents perceiving the process as "overly burdensome" and
44% perceiving it as "burdensome" cannot be broken down by type of
institution. 53 For the sample as a whole, only 8% of respondents were
from private for-profit institutions, while 32% were from four-year
private non-profits, 28% from four-year publics, and 28% from two-year

48. Jim McElhatton, Education Department Deploys 'Mystery Shoppers' to Check for
Fraud, WASH. TIMEs (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/15/
education-department-deploys-mystery-shoppers-to-c/.
49. Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.

U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at iii.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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the remaining were from
public and private institutions
graduate/professional only institutions). 4 The raw incidence of few forprofits is suggestive itself. More troubling, perhaps, is that the underlying
data from the survey are unavailable in any form for ex-post analysis of
differential patterns across the survey responses. 5 5 Only simple
tabulations remain available.
The consequence of this situation is that although 83% of executives
and 73% of office managers agreed that sector-specific regulatory
reforms were desirable, it is not possible to delve into the report's
statement that "support for sector-specific regulations differed by
institutional type and control." 56
The incentives to support regulatory reform (or to report regulatory
burden) depend on a firm's competitive situation in a market. Over time,
two trends are evident in the regulatory space for student financial
assistance. First, as federal involvement in backstopping the lending
process increased, calls came to reform the regulatory compliance
process for post-secondary education institutions.5 7 Second, with each
reform opportunity, the trend was towards greater involvement by those
institutions in the process of identifying reform opportunities. 5 8
However, two additional trends are also evident. Along with the calls
for regulatory reform, there was also pressure to search for and prosecute
fraud (often seen as located in the for-profit sector). 5 9 The second, a
counter-trend, is that the search process complicated the gathering of data
about the prospects and need for regulatory reform.
Where does this leave the assessment of opportunities for institutional
change in the student financial assistance regulatory space? On the one
hand, the most significant assessment of the regulatory compliance
process indicates (a) strong dissatisfaction with the current system and
(b) strong beliefs that reform should be sector-specific. On the other hand,
these findings are only indicative: we have little information about the
participation of different organizations in this process, we know nothing
about how perceptions vary by sector, and the process was damaged by a
growing distrust on the part of compliance agents about the motivations
of regulators who request feedback about the process. Further, these
concerns are only intensified by a long history on the part of regulated
54. Id. at 53.
55. Confirmed to the authors in personal communications with William J. Goggin,
Executive Director, U.S. Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance (Jan. 16, 2015),
and Anthony P. Jones, former Director ofthe Higher Education Regulations Study, U.S. Advisory
Committee on Student Financial Assistance (Jan. 16, 2015).
56. U.S. ACSFA REPORT, supra note 37, at 27.

57.
58.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 3.

59.

See, e.g., GAO-1 0-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES, supranote 1, at 4.
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entities to use regulation to strengthen competitive positions, damage
competitors, and shape market outcomes.

IV. CONCLUSION

We began this Essay by reviewing the development of the concept of
regulatory burden within the context of our understanding of the
relationship between states and markets. Financial aid policy space is a
special regulatory environment; its general structure can be understood
only if we consider the special role of regulation in business-government
relations. While different types of evidence exist about the financial
assistance regulatory environment, given the long-term concern about
regulatory burden in this arena, we argue that regulators should consider
the possibility that some market segments are over-regulated, and others
are under-regulated. Yet, the problem of interpreting and managing
regulatory burden means we must consider whether differential
regulation changes the incentives of different market actors.
The three notable GAO reports reviewed at the beginning of this paper
show the attention given to the ability and willingness of post-secondary
institutions to convince students to take on substantial debt. 60 The U.S.
federal government's student-loan debt portfolio of roughly $1.4 trillion
means it cannot ignore the possibility of fraud, but the trend toward
regulatory reform also introduces real dilemmas about optimization when
there is a rich array of market actors. 6 1
The fashion of pointing to "regulatory burden" makes it difficult to
assess the procedures for joint implementation of this system. The 2013
call from the NASFAA for "greater transparency,". "a more detailed
understanding," and "constructive dialogue" makes neutral assessment
problematic. 6 2 Balancing regulatory burden with protection against
predatory practices is complicated by the federal government's unique
role as a central purchaser of education.
Inevitably, policy improves when information is available that
accurately reflects the differential incentives of market actors. It is
unfortunate that a conflagration of events has concealed such information
from designers tasked with improving the regulatory environment. While
it is natural to hope that the next reform initiative will improve our
information base for making such important policy decisions, the track
record suggests differently.
Yet, the trends present in this domain show exactly why such
60. GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS, supra note 1; GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES, supra note 1; GAO-I1 -10, HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 1.
61. See OFF. OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 6.
62. NASFAA, supra note 9, at 7.
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information is hard to come by. Regulated entities have incentives, one
of which is to shape the information regulators have for improving the
system. In the end, a neutral third-party would be best positioned for
gathering, processing, and interpreting such information. Parties like
NASFAA have interests, and parties like the Advisory Commission are
limited to a degree by the fraud investigations of GAO and ED.
Academics are probably best positioned for such a task.
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